

**Resonant Leaders Leveraging Community and Country Sustained, Desired Change: The
Case of the Amazing Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan**

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May 30, 2009

Presented at the Business as an Agent of World Benefit, 2009 Virtual Global Forum

Ali Ahmed woke up this morning in the Spring of 1959 on his 2.5 acre farm in South Rampur, with about 500 neighbors (about 90 families). He is, “poorer than his father was. He is illiterate and it appears that his children must remain illiterate also. He owns only one bullock, whereas his grandfather owned four. He has less than half the land his grandfather held. He is head over heels in debt, on which he pays half his total farm production in interest. He is at the mercy of the wind, the flood and the drought. There is a black future ahead and little that can be done about it. This is what Ali and all his neighbors believe” (Fairchild & Huq, 1961, pp. 10).

The world was about to change for Ali Ahmed and his neighbors in this rural part of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Within four years, their food production had almost tripled through the use of fertilizer, better seeds, better planting techniques, irrigation, electricity to run pumps, and planting a third crop. Their village council had saved money, even after they had bought a tractor, electrical pumps for the irrigation ditches, and more livestock. A new set of possibilities opened up for Ali, his family and neighbors. They and their children had the possibility of a better future.

Pakistan Academy for Village Development at Comilla (then East Pakistan) made this happen. These were the result of the efforts of many people, but the inspiration, dedication and potent leadership of Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan was the tipping point. The Achilles’ heel of sustainable community development has been the inability of development projects to generate widespread grass-roots (Khan & Tsendorf, 2001). The Comilla and the Orangi Pilot in Karachi projects stand out as marvels of success in social mobilization. What links them is but the philosophy of one man – Dr. Khan.

This paper is about how Dr. Khan approached the project and made it work beyond the wildest dreams of most professionals in the rural, community development field at the time. He

began micro-finance projects. His work inspired the Nobel Laureate, Mohammad Yunus, to create micro-financing projects in India, the Grameen Bank, and the Grameen Phone Project. Today, they still inspire projects all over the world, like the Shakti Project of Unilever in India or Annapurna Project in Ghana. But few people are aware of the work of Dr. Khan, his legacy, and how he started this all in the late 1950's. This paper hopes to correct this oversight and show why these efforts worked so well for so long when so many others failed through the application of Intentional Change Theory.

The Comilla Project in the Late 1950's

Comilla was a densely populated area in the eastern part of East Pakistan. The landholdings in Comilla were very small. The Comilla Academy for Rural development was conceived in 1950 with the intention of establishing new channels of communication between farmers and development workers and providing multidisciplinary solutions to rural problems of Comilla (Karim, 1985).

Akhtar Hameed Khan was appointed as principal of Comilla Victoria College in East Pakistan in 1950. Khan established the project for rural development in Comilla after the United States funded Village Aid program (V-AID). The V-AID was a community development program designed and drafted in the United States to be implemented in the rural areas of East Pakistan. It was typical of most first-world funded development programs. The V-AID concentrated on training of villagers. The V-AID program was launched in 1953 and failed. It was abandoned in 1961 after the government realized that V-AID had been totally ineffective in improving the material life of the people (Hussain, 1996). Khan, after his return from Michigan State University, launched the Comilla project in 1959. To do it, he created the Pakistan

Academy for Rural Development, referred to as the Academy. Advisory support for this project was provided by Harvard, Michigan State, USAID and the Ford Foundation. This was an integrated program which included the training and development center, decentralized irrigation program, strengthening of drainage embankments, and other aspects of village life.

Karim (1985) and Schumann (1967) described in detail the conception, design and implementation of the Comilla project. According to them Akhtar Hameed Khan realized that if the Comilla academy was to fulfill the mandated function of training rural development officers, then they must make close and systematic observation of village conditions. The Academy used the Kotwali Thana area (similar county in the United States) as a laboratory area for experimenting in economic development and local government. He encouraged experiments on a farm located at the Academy site. Khan believed that the process of adopting small changes and finding them effective would lead to an appetite for the villagers for larger more complicated changes. In response to the needs of the local population, three principle activities for the Academy were envisaged (Karim, 1975): (1) improvement of rural governance through training of officials; (2) conduct of research and evaluations; and (3) new type of co-operative credit system to be developed for the local farmers.

When Khan and his colleagues entered a village, they asked to speak with as many of the villagers, both male and female adults, as could be gathered. They talked of the possible benefits of a better yield of crops. Although they had a family planning objective in mind from the beginning, they decided that it was too bold to initiate at the beginning of the project in a village. They offered the villagers the opportunity for loans and training to learn about growing more crops from the same land, if the villagers met the Academy's conditions. They listed 10 conditions:

1. The adult villagers must organize into a formal group and elect officers;
2. They must hold regular weekly meetings and keep records;
3. They must save money as a group;
4. They must elect an official “organizer” who would go to the Academy twice a week for special training;
5. They must keep good accounts and have a special person appointed to the job of being the group accountant;
6. They must exercise group planning for the use of joint credit;
7. They must exercise group planning for the use of group property;
8. They must be willing to try new methods and use new machines for farming;
9. They must join a larger co-operative federation for the purpose of securing credit, purchasing, marketing services and educational materials; and
10. They must discuss as many things as possible with the whole group (Schumann, 1967).

Although these conditions were stated as demands, or conditions for access to the loans and training, Deputy Director Huq would conduct the meeting through discussion. He would ask the villagers questions and engage them in dialogue. He would try to model the group process that the Academy was expecting from them in the future. Khan knew that it would take a strong inducement to encourage the villagers to alter their age-old practices and norms. He felt that it was their current norms and practices that kept them from innovating. Current loans took a great deal of time to acquire, if they were deemed eligible. It also took a great deal of paperwork and working within the bureaucracy. The Academy offered a new access, and a new dream.

The conditions for loans under the new system were: (a) the village co-operative had to prepare an individualized plan for the use of the money; (b) the group had to secure the loan approval based on the plan; (c) they would then get the loan and use the money; and the group would then repay the loan from production, paying a portion each harvest (Schumann, 1967).

From its inception, Khan maintained a culture of collaboration between the Academy and the local farmers. In less than four years, the private sector, in the form of new co-operatives, joined with the public sector to form the KTCCA (Kotwali Thana Central Co-operative Association).

The agricultural co-operative program was the lynchpin of the Comilla project and central to the success of the program for a new model of micro-credit system. The idea of formation of co-operatives was that they would operate as primary units or catalytic agents to disseminate the ideology of development (Haq, 1978). This was done in spite of the fact that previously co-operatives had a dismal record of success in that part of the world.

The two-tier cooperative system consisted of primary village co-operatives consisting of 20 to 75 villages and a central co-operative at the sub-district level (Karim, (1975). The co-operatives at the village level may be considered as Social Units while the ones at the Thana (sub-district level) may be considered as Business Units.

The mechanisms for co-operative functioning were the demands or conditions explained earlier. Each member bought a share in the co-operative. Capital was formed with the savings of the villagers themselves. Every member was required to deposit some savings into the co-operative on a weekly basis. Farmers could pledge savings “in kind” as a portion of their harvest and amass credit in the village co-operative. The shares and deposits earned interests and dividends on market rates. Within weeks, villagers had saved several hundred rupees (about a

hundred dollars at the time) and realized that they could actually gain collective financial power. This created a new level of efficacy about their future.

The villagers jointly planned the use of purchased tractors, water-pumps and later sophisticated services such as cold-storage plants, dairy operations, and such. The central co-operative supplied the necessary agricultural supplies, credit and training. The village groups elected their own representatives every fortnight, who would receive training at the central association. The co-operative credit system helped replace the local exploitative credit institution of money lenders and also helped guide the loans to more productive channels.

Education and training was delivered to three groups of individuals in each village: (1) the “organizers” who became de facto extension agents for the Academy bringing their new knowledge and ideas about farming back to the village after each of the two classes each week at the Academy; (2) the accountants; and (3) helping the “organizer” provide training and education for all of the farmers in a village by giving them materials and teaching them how to teach and train the villagers. The organizer would learn techniques of farming, irrigation, fertilizer, and sanitation. They would learn techniques of improving the health of the children and adults. When the organizer would report a new type of problem occurring in the village at the Academy training sessions, they would discuss and explore how best to handle it under the new, expected processes.

As an incentive, the Academy would pay the Organizer for their time at the Academy and training efforts. But the expectation was that as soon as possible, the village co-operative would take over the payments for this person. Remembering that the villagers elected this person, it was an up close and personal experience with democratic processes and experiencing collective social power.

Under the dynamic leadership of Akhtar Hameed Khan, the academy had a learning environment and was willing to change direction wherever required. The staff and participants in the Comilla project learned through an inductive process.

As the experiment evolved, members of local government agencies were brought into the experiment and given access to the same education and training. They were encouraged to explore discussion and problem solving behavior, instead of relying on established procedures and policy—the typical bureaucratic response.

In 1962, public works programs in drainage and road building began. A marketing project also was started to sell the produce from the co-operatives. A cold-storage plant and rice mill were started. At the same time, a Women's Program began including the training of midwives and education in home cleanliness. In 1963, the United Bank took over all credit operations. The Rural Electrification Project started. A Creamery and Dairy Co-operative was formed. The larger co-operative began to sell rice and potatoes and vegetables. Three other experiments, like Comilla, were begun in other parts of East Pakistan. By 1964, irrigation programs and communications between villages were established. A library was created and distributed literature at the Academy. General adult education programs were begun.

The Comilla model showed that farmers with small land holdings in developing countries can be organized in a way to bring changes in their living conditions. The staff of the Academy made positive use of cultural factors. For example, since many farmers gathered at the mosque for Friday prayers, the training sessions were usually made to coincide with the end of the Friday prayers.

The Comilla approach can be summed up as the process of institution building which dealt realistically with local conditions and took care to hold the interest and cooperation of the

involved officials and people. Raper (1970) observes that the Comilla model may not be considered as much a formula for development but in fact a formula for finding a formula for development to fit indigenous conditions.

The results were dramatic. Rice production almost tripled in the early years of the project, and continued to become more than twice the national average per acre by 1980. Family farm income increased by 210% in the 1960's, as compared to 100% increase in neighboring thanas (Barkat-Khuda, Harbison & Robinson, 1988). By July, 1964, 156 village co-operatives had been established with a membership of 5,980 people. Cash savings of Rs. 3,75,305, shared capital of Rs. 54,125, and reserve savings of Rs. 21,13,777 were realized (Schumann, 1967).

The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP)

Orangi is perched on a hill on Karachi's north-western suburb. The Orangi Pilot Project, or OPP is considered as the world's most successful experiment in improving the lives of the urban poor (Pearce, 1996). In 1980's, Akhtar Hamed Khan started OPP in Karachi, a bottom-up community development initiative. "The Orangi Pilot Project was very different from the Comilla Academy. OPP was a private body, dependent for its small fixed budget on another NGO. The vast resources and support of the government, Harvard advisors, MSU, and Ford Foundation was missing. OPP possessed no authority, no sanctions. It may observe and investigate but it could only advise, not enforce" (Khan, 1996, pg. 42).

Khan's main aim in Orangi was to improve sanitary conditions in the Karachi slum, known as Orangi. He knew that access to hygienic sanitation in the world declined in the last decade as construction fell behind population growth. Almost 3 billion people did not have access to a decent toilet (Khan, 1997).

OPP considered itself a research organization. Its objective was to analyze problems of Orangi township through action research and then provide extension education to discover solution to those problems. OPP hoped to help the community begin self-management and provide technical support (Khan, 1996). It wanted to help mobilize local financial and managerial resources by encouraging the practice of co-operative action. OPP was initially sponsored by Agha Hassan Abedi of Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Khan, 1992).

Orangi Township began as an unplanned settlement in the outskirts of the sprawling city of Karachi in 1962 (Inayatullah & Birley, 1996). By the mid 1980's, it extended over eight thousand acres and had a population of about one million (Akhtar, 1992). The generally unplanned and informal settlements were predominantly underserved by public utilities. The government was reluctant to acknowledge their existence, and so refused to provide services. The Orangi settlement was set up on the outskirts of Karachi by enterprising migrants from the rural areas and refugees from East Pakistan.

In 1970, the Karachi Municipal authorities accepted the fact that the Orangi settlement was there to stay. Now, people could procure title to land and feel a sense of permanency but also incentive to invest to improve their living conditions (Khan, 1997). But the public sector was still almost non-existent. Only a tenth of schools and clinics were state-run (Pearce, 1996).

In 1980, the bucket latrines or soak pits were being used by the Orangi residents for disposal of solid human waste. Open sewers disposed the waste water. Akhtar Hameed Khan (1992) termed such sanitation methods as medieval. When there is a medieval level of sanitation, there is medieval of health and no country can advance without a healthy population (Akhtar, 1997). Sanitation was the most urgent need of Orangi. But the cost of laying sewage pipes was

out of the reach of the locals. So, the first focus of the OPP was to build a modern sewerage system.

According to Dr. Khan there were four major barriers for communities to work together and develop the infrastructure on their own (Khan, 1996). These were

- a) Psychological barriers like the belief in urban slum communities of the developing world that they would get sanitation and water from the government as a free service. The old socialist model that everything will be done for the people failed in Orangi;
- b) Financial barriers like the belief that the cost of construction and maintenance is not affordable for them to be able to do it on their own;
- c) Social barriers like the belief that mechanisms for collective working and trust amongst the community members is lacking; and
- d) Technical barriers like the belief that the requisite expertise for construction and maintenance is not available within the community.

Khan and his colleagues decided to help the residents of Orangi remove the above barriers. They believed that the same approach to development applied in Comilla, using research, community involvement and responsibility, would work in Orangi. Khan spent time in the community, seeking to understand their culture and ways. They found and told the residents that, due to disease, their medical bills were six times more than for people living in sanitary conditions. Khan called this the health-tax (Khan, 1997). These are extra expenses that the poor can otherwise spend on food, school, and such.

The OPP experts found ingenious ways to drastically bring down the cost of modern sewerage line construction. By simplifying the design and eliminating the middle man, Khan proposed that the residents could construct the system with themselves. The removal of the

economic barrier of the high cost of latrines could be the catalyst which would lead to the removal of the other three barriers.

OPP proposed that they could buy all necessary materials if each household paid an average of \$42 (Khan, 1992). This was an average month's salary for an Orangi family. Combined, the residents invested about two million dollars of their own in the project. There was no loan or subsidy but just a willingness to improve their own future. The Orangi residents began to consider that they were not destitute. After all, they had built their houses as solid structures in the squatter settlement which had cost them about \$ 1500 each. They also paid for electricity and water connections.

There are four levels of a modern sanitation system which were required to be constructed (Khan, 1992): (1) inside the house – the sanitary latrine; (2) in the street/lane – underground sewerage lines with house connections; (3) secondary or collector drains; and (4) main drain and treatment plants.

The residents were willing and capable of financing all the sanitary arrangements at the first three levels. The main drain and the treatment plant had to be the responsibility of the government.

The basic structural unit of the OPP is the lane or the street. Each small street or lane in Orangi has approximately 20-30 houses on the average. The lane was typically cohesive and was the smallest level possible since the sewerage pipe would take effluent of the entire lane to the secondary sewage pipe.

It took Khan more than three months of cajoling before the first lane agreed to participate in the project (Mustafa, 1984). A lane manager was chosen by the households in each lane. This person would collect contributions and allocate work. The OPP only provided technical details.

The sewage line was laid on a lane by lane basis. The people were organized and trained to lay down the sanitation system. Because Khan believed deviance and error of judgment was typical, the residents have to want the changes or the project is not sustainable. As the work progressed, the OPP crafted a master plan after it felt that it knew the people, their needs and the culture of Orangi and it solicited a great deal of input from the residents.

The OPP's technical team of architect, surveyor, draughtsman and other qualified persons supervised and assisted the construction of the lane's latrines, primary and secondary drains. At the same time, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS), which was given a part of Orangi to provide sewerage system, failed miserably. They had used the traditional pre-planned, target-oriented, systematic plan in community development. The UNCHS later admitted that OPPs philosophy and approach was more effective (Khan, 1996).

OPP now runs the following model programs in Orangi: (a) construction and maintenance of low cost sanitation program; (b) low cost housing program; (c) health and family planning program; (d) enhancement of women's skills in the garment sector; (e) up gradation of schools; and (f) micro-credit for family enterprises.

Women's skill development became a principal program target. Khan that gender inequality has been shown to significantly hinder community's economic and social development (Epstein & Kim, 2007). Khan saw that with rising inflation, women would have to contribute to the household earnings, along with men. He felt that the traditional, patriarchal system had to give way. He created a special emphasis on their skill development and micro-credits for women. In his reminiscences, Khan (1996) said he was touched by the emergence of women working in Orangi, and by the fact that better education, health and incomes were becoming possible for all because of them. Khan considered the development of the Orangi

women as the “finest achievement of the Orangi” project and “the best preparation for entering the twenty-first century” (Khan, 1996, pg. xli).

In Orangi, a population of 1 million constructed, in one decade, with their own money and management, without loans or subsidy, 5610 underground lane sewers, 163563 rft secondary drains and 85000 flush latrines. They invested their own \$2.5 million U.S. dollars (Khan, 1992). Now virtually every home in Orangi has a hygienic latrine connected to an underground sewerage, which has all been paid for by the residents (Khan, 1997). This has helped Orangi control disease and damage to their property. The infant mortality rate, a key target of the sanitation projects improved dramatically from 130 in 1984 to 37 in 1991. It has popularized collective action, gained social cohesion and made Orangi a success story for others to follow. Despite absence of state schools, the literacy rate amongst the young is 70 percent, way above the national average (Pearce, 1996).

The Birth of Micro-finance

As a result of the publicity that came with the Nobel prize, many people assume that Muhammad Yunus invented microcredit model for poor people. But the idea of microcredit, in its current form, was introduced in 1959 by Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan in the Comilla Project and then later used in the Orangi project (Dossey, 2007). Muhammad Yunus, was a student of the Comilla Academy and was inspired by the leadership of Akhtar Hameed Khan (Valsan, 2005). “Today micro-credit has become a buzzword in the lexicon of development practitioners for poverty alleviation throughout the world but 35 years ago this idea was pioneered in Comilla” (Yousaf, 2003, pg.373).

Jeffrey Sachs (2005) observed in *The End of Poverty* that at the most fundamental level, the key to ending poverty is to enable the poor to get their foot on the ladder of development. Most of these poor lack the capital necessary to get such a foothold. A lack of credit is seen as one of the biggest constraint for micro-enterprises. Events of 2008 and 2009 around the world showed that a lack of liquidity has a similar effect on inhibiting and even damaging economic development of industries and entire societies. Giving credit to the poor helps trigger start-ups and increases economic participation of the poor (Inayatullah & Birley, 1996). Khan's microfinance program gave these poor a boost up to the first rung on this ladder of development.

In the case of Comilla, loan was given to village co-operative society only if its members had accumulated some weekly saving of its members. The savings served as collateral against loans (Karim, 1975). The rate of repayment in Comilla was an outstanding 98.5 % (Raper, 1970). Peer pressure was observed to be one of the main reasons for the high rate of loan repayment.

The Orangi Pilot Project took a different approach. OPP selected individual enterprises for closely supervised credits. The credits are given by the Orangi Charitable Trust (OCT), which is an extension of the OPP. The OCT began its operations with a grant of about \$700,000 US dollars from its parent organization, the OPP (Khan, 1992). From this amount about half was pledged to a local bank for overdraft facility. At the initial stages, OCT provided loans from its revolving fund, after borrowing from commercial banks with whom OCT had an overdraft facility agreement. Later, OCT started receiving donations and became less dependent on the commercial banks.

It was believed that the selected micro-entrepreneurs were capable of making loan repayments. The role of the guarantors is crucial since their honor is at stake. They lose their credibility with the bank and the locality if borrower defaults. There have been many cases

where the guarantor has forced the borrower to pay up or have made repayments themselves (Inayatullah & Birley, 1996).

The first loans were given on verbal agreement only. The OCT gave direct loans to those who had established businesses or wanted to start their own. OCT evaluated all loan applications through a network of area supervisors. The process of selection of borrowers was informal and drew heavily on the reputation of the individuals in the community. Only verbal collateral were required when a local vouches for the borrower. The loans varied between \$20 to \$1,000 US dollars. Originally, a market rate of 18 percent per annum was charged on the loans. Between 1987 and 2005, OCT gave loans of \$6.3 million US dollars (Zaidi et al., 2006).

OPP encouraged women to be independent and turn their homes into workshop. Family businesses sprouted in every neighborhood and women became entrepreneurs. Orangi family enterprises operated as cottage industries. They were located within family dwellings and utilized the labor of their men, women and children. OCT gave loans mostly to family businesses employing about a half a dozen people. A fifth of these entrepreneurs were women. They were involved in activities like stitching shopping bags, dusters, and such which were sold as far as Europe (Pearce, 1996). A majority of the households in Orangi have prospered as a result of the loans (Zaidi et al., 2006).

Micro-credit has had the most favorable impact on the moderately poor. Some of the very poor could not sustain the loan repayment. They had a default of about 5%. For the moderately poor, dramatic positive impact was a result of OCT providing credit to those who could not obtain it from other sources. The success of the micro-finance program attracted many groups in different parts of Pakistan to replicate the program.

The same methodology was adopted by Yunus for the Grameen Bank. The poor pay back not because they are afraid but because they can see that their interest is better served by repayment. Given that a majority of the population in Pakistan and Bangladesh is Muslim, from a religious point of view, it is considered undesirable that one does repay loans. Yunus actually embarked in 2003 on unprecedented drive of giving loans to the beggars to sell good as they go from house to house, and allowing them to pay back whenever they want. It has turned to be a great success. The rate of repayment was better than most commercial banks experience. Also within two years about 10 % of the beggars in the program on the streets of Bangladesh had stopped begging (Schleicher, 2006)

Understanding the Process of Sustained, Desired Change

Ahktar Hameed Khan changed Comilla and Orangi through intentional efforts. He was able to bring the desired changes in a sustainable manner. Khan's dreams of the desired future was a function of his sense of calling which was driven by his passion, values and operating philosophy (Boyatzis & Akrivou, 2006).

The reason why the process worked can be explained by Intentional Change Theory (Boyatzis, 2006). Intentional Change Theory (i.e., ICT) describes the essential components and processes that encourage sustained, desired change to occur in a person's behaviors, thoughts, feelings and/or perceptions (Boyatzis, 2006), as shown in Figure 1. Because it is a multi-level theory, it also describes sustained, desired change at other levels of human organization (Boyatzis, 2006), such as organizations (Van Oosten, 2006), communities and countries. The theory includes five phases or discontinuities, called "discoveries" (Boyatzis, 2006; Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002). The five phases include: (1) the Ideal Self, or Shared Vision within

the community, lane or village; (2) the Real Self, or Group's Balance Sheet; (3) creation of a shared Learning Agenda and Plan; (4) Experimentation and Practice with new behaviors, thoughts or feelings outlined in the Learning Plan, and (5) building trusting Relationships that support the community's development.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Akhtar instilled hope for the future in the people of Comilla and Orangi so that they would be motivated to change (Boyatzis, 2006) by encouraging the villagers and lane residents to consider a different future (i.e., to dream) and to build their sense of efficacy through succeeding at small steps, like saving a few dollars. Hope fed creativity. These are crucial components of an Ideal (Boyatzis & Akrivou, 2006), as shown in Figure 2.

Insert Figure 2 about here

At the same time, the support for enhanced group process helped to build relationships (Boyatzis and Akrivou, 1996). The villagers in Comilla and residents in the former slum of Orangi developed a shared vision by talking about their plans and making joint decisions. New interpersonal processes enabled new relationships, which further enable establishment of shared ideals as well as shared decisions and actions. These relationships, which are the fifth discovery

in ICT, enable the community to continue their new and effective interpersonal processes and to support each other.

The relationships that enable the multi-level change also provide a key linking function (Boyatzis, 2006). A tenant of complex systems is that some factor moves information across the multi-levels of the system. ICT contends that resonance leaders and the emergence of a social identity group provide this linking function (Boyatzis, 2006; Boyatzis, in press). But they not only move information across the levels, they also move emotions and facilitate new networks of social relationships. Khan and his staff trained the leaders who in turn trained the village farmers of Comilla and urban residents of Orangi. It was the chain of relationships that helped support the sustainability of the change at each level while using the change at one level to provoke and incite change at the other levels. The participative nature of the two projects by which all learnt and acquired skills made the relationships more resonant. This multi-level system and the linking factors for the Comilla Project are shown in Figure 3.

Insert Figure 3 about here

The approach that emerges from the studies of Comilla and Orangi is that community development is rooted in the framework of ICT. It is a matter of sowing seeds of hope which will set processes into motion of building upon the past, and envisioning the future but not as a pre-determined outcome but as a continuous commitment to change, to achieve the desired outcome.

A Brief Biography of Dr. Khan, Resonant Leader

Akhtar Hameed Khan was a Pakistani development activist and social scientist (1914-1999). During his childhood and early adulthood, he was influenced by the Sufi tradition of Rumi. He earned a Masters in English literature and joined the prestigious Indian Civil Services. He however left the service because he did not want to become a bureaucrat. He experimented living the life of a laborer for a year and then a locksmith to fully understand the hardships of the blue-collar class. Having gained this insight, he wanted to prepare for new ideas in community development, so he pursued and received an Honorary Doctorate of Law from Michigan State University. He became a Visiting Professor at the Michigan State University and later was the recipient of the prestigious Magsaysay award, and Hilal-e-Imtiaz; the highest civil award of Pakistan.

Khan was inspired, while teaching at Michigan State, in the community development ideas of Abraham Lincoln. As President of the United States, Lincoln established land grant colleges. The idea was for scholars to come out of their office-spaces and examine the traditional farming practices and conduct research for improvement. This led to the discoveries of pest control, fertilizers and high yielding crops. These discoveries were then conveyed to the farmers by extension workers. Initially there was skepticism amongst farmers for acceptance, but as the advantages became apparent the agrarian community readily adopted it. Such research and extension activities of land grant colleges made the US farmers, the most productive and progressive in the world (Khan, 1998).

Resonant leaders are those that listen to and hear others, inspire trust and a positive shared vision; and are mindful (McKee, Boyatzis & Johnston, 2008). Inspiration is important in the alleviation of poverty (Valsan, 2005). Khan followed Gandhian idealism in launching community development program in Comilla. He, in turn, inspired the staff and farmers of

Comilla and later, the urban poor of Orangi to bring about change. The village and lane leaders created a contagion of hope as they were able to inspire thousands of their countrymen. Their shared vision provided an impetus for social mobilization.

Through his own mindfulness of the conditions of life for the poor, Khan was able to design programs and processes that aligned and united the behavior of individuals and groups. Akhtar observed, in his time working as a laborer, that a community's economic prosperity was embedded in a structure of social relations (Cernea, 1991). *"Most programs developed for the poor in the Third World fail because they are designed by professionals who belong to the upper classes and are not fully conversant with the sociology, economics, and culture of the low-income communities or the causes of conditions in low-income settlements"* (Khan, 1996, pg. xxii). Khan's philosophy of cooperation through participation permeated Comilla and Orangi.

Akhtar Hameed Khan was unique man in many ways. He had a charismatic personality (Yousaf, 2003). Khan had the elements of being emotionally intelligent (Boyatzis & McKee, 2005). Not only was Khan self-aware and able to show a great deal of self-discipline but he believed that everyone needs be aware of the needs of others before helping design development programs. Khan belonged to a class and a culture in which austerity and diligence were an integral part. He withstood adversity with patience and fortitude. He was accused of being a CIA agent when he left Bangladesh and in his native Pakistan he was persecuted on trumped-up charges of blasphemy (*Economist*, 1994), but he stood firm.

Khan avoided fanfare. In fact, he believed that the consequences of premature publicity are as bad as that of grandiose planning. He believed that the public should be informed with impartial reports as a project progresses (Khan, 1996). He did not believe in the diagnosis-prescription approach to rural development. Khan thought this traditional approach is based on

outsiders' arrogance of knowledge of the poor (Khan & Khan,1992). Norman Uphoff (1992) characterizes such development models as mechanistic and abhorring which obscures many opportunities for positive change.

Sustainability of the Model Projects

The Comilla approach was replicated in many parts of Bangladesh. Following its success in Comilla, the village-based cooperative or Comilla model for development, which later became known as the Comprehensive Village Development Program (CVDP), was adopted as a development strategy for the whole of Bangladesh. In the 490 thanas of Bangladesh, 63,000 village-based cooperative societies with 2.2 million members were being managed (Bhuiyan, Faraizi & McAllister, 2005). However, it was not successful everywhere.

The Orangi Pilot Project model has also been replicated. OPP's sanitation model is being replicated in other urban slums of Karachi such as Chanesar Goth, Manzoor colony, Mauripur etc. It is also being replicated in other cities of the country such as Sukkur and Lodhran (Khan, 1992). UNICEF has accepted Orangi approach to low-cost sanitation as a model for UNICEF Urban Basic services. The World Bank program for housing development is using a similar arrangement. Within Pakistan, OPP serves as technical advisor to the UNICEF, World Bank and Swiss development Corporation Projects as well as training center for their personnel.

Besides the Grameen Bank and Grameen Phone Project, these projects have been replicated and extended elsewhere in the private sector as well. Unilever used this design to promote economic development in rural villages, increased health care and education in India through the Shakti Project and Ghana through the Anapurna Project (Global Forum, 2007).

Improvement of people's lives and the hopes for their children is a basic human quest. Those without access to the vehicles of personal financial success, or health, or education, become oppressed as they succumb to the belief that their plight is inevitable. They become enslaved.

The work of Dr. Ahktar Hameed Khan in Comilla and Orangi created a new life for millions of people. In the process, they also created a model of community development that has inspired many to offer help to others. They have ignited hope and stirred the contagion of hope. Dr. Khan achieved an amazing legacy!

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Figure 1. Village/Community Intentional Change Theory (adapted from Boyatzis, 2006; McKee, Boyatzis & Johnson, 2008; Boyatzis, in press)




Figure 2. Components of the Ideal Self and Vision at the Individual Level (from Boyatzis and Akrivou, 2006)




Figure 3. Multi-Level Model of Community Development and the Role of Leadership in the Comilla Project




Table 1. Aspects of the Comilla Project Shown in Terms of the Stages of Intentional Change Theory

Stages of ICT	Comilla Activities/Process
Ideal, Shared Vision [village shared vision]	Plan as a group, possibility of micro-loans, efficacy from discovery that they can save, new aspiration for village process
Real	New norms of interaction within the village, co-op, and multi-village co-op
Learning Agenda	Village organizer was trained at the Academy and then brought learning back to the village
Experimentation/ Practice	Trying new social norms in group meetings, saving small amount of money or “in-kind” produce, new roles within village system
Resonant Relationships	Villager organizer became a teacher coach for others when bringing back learning to pass on to others

Multiple Levels	Within family, within village, within multi-village co-op, at the Academy, in the regional government
Resonant Leadership	Village organizer often became a resonant leader, people from the Academy were often resonant
Social Identity Groups	Village shared efficacy as innovators and savers, larger multi-village co-op became an SIG